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The need for rights is uniquely human, arising out of uniquely
human social relationships. Domesticated and captive non-human be-
ings, as a part of the human organization of society, can be seen as
qualifying for "prosthetic" rights on the same grounds as human mem-
bers. Wild nature, on the other hand, seems not to require rights be-
tween co-existing participants, and certainly not between species. The
capacity for humankind to be able to "confer" rights upon the non-
human world would require all existence to be moved under human
control. The goals of many environmentalists thus have become para-
doxical.
By and large, "environmentalists" are humanists, not biocentrists.
Most current discussions of "environmental rights" centre on the inter-
ests of human beings as against those of other human beings. Such
discussions usually come down to questions of relative individual, group
and public interest. While there may be sufficient philosophical, legal
and other existing frameworks for their ultimate, if gradual, resolution,
the political obstacles to implementation are formidable. In a lesser
measure, valiant attempts to bestow legal rights on "the environment"
continue, and valiant intellectual enterprises attempt to bring non-
human beings under the umbrella of human ethical systems. Both ef-
forts may prove to be misguided. The environmental problem is not a
technical, legal or moral problem, but a metaphysical one.
I. THE NEED FOR RIGHTS
In the attempts to ascribe rights to the non-human, there is little,
if any, theoretical, philosophical or legal basis for the arguments. De-
bates surrounding rights for the non-human customarily flounder on
definitions such as, for example, of moral subjects and objects; such
definitions are inescapably anthropomorphic and lose all meaning in the
attempted translation to the biomorphic. The difficulty inherent in
these discussions arises in great measure from the failure to acknowl-
edge that concepts of rights arise in human social environments which
are built on dominance hierarchies or other forms of power relation-
ships. That there were many and still are very few human societies (for
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example, hunter-gatherers) in which competitive power relationships do
not appear to exist1 indicates that the need for the concept of rights is
neither universal nor absolute; power relationships appear to be pecu-
liar to more "advanced" or "civilized" human organizations, especially
those in which rank and achievement are symbolized by the accumula-
tion of commodities, such as cattle, wives and other accroutrements.
Human uniqueness among biological beings is frequently justified
on the basis that people are the only moral species. This assertion may
be disputed on a variety of grounds, most ultimately hanging on seman-
tics. There is a good reason to think, however, that the statement may
well be accurate. People are uniquely moral beings for the radical rea-
son that there is a need to be moral. Humankind is probably the only
species that lives in a state of almost perpetual stress, and for whom
the pathology of stress-induced structured dominance has become a
way of life. Morality may be seen as indicative of a pathological social
organization. It is caused by unnatural populations density. Socially co-
operative mammals (of which human beings are one among many)
cannot tolerate crowding. If numbers within a social group rise above
normal levels for a species, individuals may respond aggressively and
competitively; a hierarchy of domination based on physical power may
emerge. Such an arrangement, as it is stress-induced, may be seen as a
pathological social condition.a It is "natural" to the extent that it is a
behavioural response, but it is not healthy. Further, it does not augur
well for either individuals, or the group.
I have recently argued4 that human moral and ethical systems,
among other cultural techniques of social control, may be seen as sur-
rogates for "natural" forms of behaviour, which although they still ex-
ist in human biology, have been at least temporarily suppressed by the
pathological structure of power and dominance on the basis of which
most human societies are currently organized. As an institution, the
arrangement is continuously reinforced by tradition and convention,
' Fromm analyzed thirty "primitive" cultures, and identified a syndrome in which competi-
tiveness was linked with individualism, private property, dominance hierarchy, and tension in
those societies which were strongly aggressive. In others, including those of the Pueblo and the
Eskimo, which Fromm terms "life-affirmative societies," he found "little envy, covetousness, greed
and exploitativeness . . . little competition and individualism and a great deal of cooperation...
trust, and confidence, not only in others but particularly in nature." See Fromm, The Anatomy of
Human Destructiveness (1973) at 168.
1 Id. at 169.
3 Rowell, The Concept of Social Dominance (1974), 11 Behavioural Biology 131.
4 Livingston, "Ethics as Prosthetics," in Hanson and Dugaid, eds., Proceedings of 1983 Envi-
ronmental Ethics Research Workshop (as yet unpublished, 1984). In this paper, the prosthesis is
explicated in the context of the self-domestication of technological mankind.
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that is, culture. Moral, ethical and legal systems may be seen as part of
a "prosthesis", set in the place of abandoned biological ways of peace-
ful group co-existence.
II. RATIONALIZING THE NEED
Power structures have been so deeply and pervasively embedded in
human social behaviour for so long, that it is easy to understand how
concepts of striving, of competition and of achievement have come to
be assumed as universal, or even, natural. The concensus of reality hav-
ing to do with political arrangement based on power is rarely seriously
questioned, save by anarchists, whose arguments tend to be humanistic
rather than biological.6 So fundamental is the survival of the pow-
erfully competitive believed to be, that modern biology was able to take
what is essentially a sociological, economic and political principle, and
to project it upon all of non-human nature.6 Charles Darwin did not
invent the concept of a competitive struggle for existence, but he ar-
gued it with such elegance and persuasiveness that it entered the main-
stream of Western thought as "a blinding flash of the obvious." 7
If we are able to see natural processes as competitive, goal-ori-
ented and dominance-striving, it is seductively easy to see the human
ethical prosthesis as an advance over brute systems of social organiza-
tion. The non-scientific public is as yet largely unaware that concepts of
dominance and competition in the non-human world are presently
under serious challenge on grounds not merely hypothetical.8 Non-
human societies and multispecies communities may be organized in
ways that are closer to those of "primifive" human hunting-and-gather-
ing societies than those of the prosthetic sophisticated civilization.
If people form the only moral society, it is for reasons dramatically
different from those most usually purveyed in the humanistic cultural
tradition. Non-human nature does not appear to require prosthetic
5 Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society (1980) and The Ecology of Freedom (1982). As
a social reformer, Bookchin is one of a handful of contributors who seem to be able to bridge the
gap between "deep ecology" and action. His vision of the healthy human community, derived
from both social and environmental scholarship and reflection, has much importance for "environ-
mental rights."
Clark, in The Nature of the Beast: Are Animals Moral? (1982), writing not from the social
or political perspective, but as a moral philosopher, comes to useful "ecological" and "ethological"
conclusions on power structures, dominance, aggression and so on. It is an important contribution.
6 Worster, Nature's Economy: The Roots of Ecology (1977).
7 This is attributed to Thomas Henry Huxley, when first examining Darwin's thesis. He is
also said to have exclaimed, "How stupid of me not to have thought of that!" Id. at 182.
8 Harvey and Silvertown, Can Theoretical Ecology Keep A Competitive Edge? (1983), 99
New Scientist 760 at 760-63.
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means of social control, because it has not yet amputated mutual and
peaceful co-existence from its behavioural repertoire. Observers trained
in the humanistic tradition are quick to state that singing birds are
aggressively defending proprietary interests against would-be interlop-
ers of the same species. On the same objective observation, it is possible
to speculate that the would-be interlopers are neighbours who respect
the personal distance of the celebratory singers. Humanistic observers
can too easily theorize that a male gorilla is dominant on the grounds
that he is bigger than a female, and that no one "monkeys" with him.
It is possible, again on the objective observation, to note that gorillas
are not predisposed toward "monkeying around," and that male goril-
las happen to be bigger than female gorillas. Humanistic observers can
readily perceive plant species as competitively striving for resources,
and aiming to achieve successional dominance over a particular site.
But, on the objective view, it is also possible to perceive certain co-
existing plant species as appropriate to certain ecological conditions,
and others to different conditions.
It is the wont of the humanistic observer to view the "struggle for
existence" as fundamentally natural. On the same body of evidence (or
lack of it) the biocentric observer may think it anomolous and patho-
logical. Such are the ways of worldviews. Neither extreme interpreta-
tion is sustainable on Cartesian method, but since one view is the child
of Cartesian metaphysics, and the other is not, the truth is summarily
laid down. Many "philosophical naturalists," to use Darwin's term, are
persuaded that non-human nature, far from being competitively preoc-
cupied with the achievement of future goals, gives the consistent ap-
pearance of present complementary co-existence. If this is accurate, the
assumption of a competitive goal-oriented struggle in non-human na-
ture is not sustainable. Nor are dominance structures and relationships.
Therefore it necessarily follows that in a state of nature, rights have no
meaning.
There are, however, countless numbers of non-human beings who
are not in a state of nature. There are many familiar situations in
which the concept of rights could and should be applied to non-human
existences. While these have been addressed by numerous authors on
moral and ethical grounds, I will present a slightly different formula.
III. PROSTHETIC RIGHTS FOR SLAVES?
Animals (restricted here to mammals) are domesticated for four
basic purposes: as pets, as servants, as sources of food and clothing and
as human surrogates in experimental research. Some, such as the dog
and horse, may be used for all four purposes, but most are used for
[VOL. 22, NO. 2
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three. Such sensate beings are bought and sold on the open market as
commodities. The essence of domestication is tractability, docility and
manageability. This is obtained through selective breeding, by system-
atic dismantling of the animal's social dependence on conspecifics,
while at the same time maintaining, encouraging and re-directing its
innate need to participate in a group social arrangement. Group inter-
dependence is replaced by one-way dependence on the human proprie-
tor. In social animals (including those species from which the dog and
all hoofed domesticates descend), to belong (to a group) is a fundamen-
tal biological imperative, as it is for the human species. In domestica-
tion, this imperative is retained, but the bond of social dependence is
shifted to the proprietor. Through this exploitation of the animal's own
drive to belong, there emerges a relationship with the proprietor that is
qualitatively different from the mere owner-owned relationship. In a
social sense at least, and including the sense of dependence, the animal
has become a literal extension of the proprietor. Unfortunately, it is
necessary to point out the extraordinary lack of sensitivity to the psy-
chological needs of the animal. Since it has been brought directly into
the human social unit, as a moral being, the proprietor would seem to
have no alternative but to treat it as a functioning member of that
social unit.9 Drawn, body and mind, into the human social organiza-
tion, it becomes part of the power-based prosthetic dominance struc-
ture. Domestication has conferred upon it interests that deserve to be
recognized in the interest of all members of the organization. On psy-
chological and behavioural grounds alone, there is simply no civilized
alternative to this view.
That the legislators, legal theorists and philosophers have tended
not to address this argument, usually preferring to emphasize the obli-
gation of moral animals which arises from control of second and third
class beings, is less a matter of politics, the law and moral philosophy
than of the cultural bias that towers over and dominates virtually all
intellectual pursuit. It is a comment on moral beings themselves, and
on the undeniable chauvinism that pervades our prosthetic cultural in-
0I would emphasize that this argument does not need to address such speciesist caveats as
relative levels of sentience, self-awareness, intelligence and reason, significance in the divine eye,
and of human beings as unique "ends-in-themselves" as contrasted with mere animal means.
These specious claims (none sustainable on scientific grounds) have been disposed of. See Singer,
"Animals and the Value of Life," in Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death (1980) at 218 and
Animal Liberation (1975). See also Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality (1981).
My reason for taking a different approach is my (admittedly lay) perception of the self-
defeating nature of conventional philosophic and legal argument, mounted as it must be within the
inherently chauvinistic framework of Western thought.
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stitutions. 1 Failure to acknowledge this fundamental flaw in Western
moral and ethical systems (that is, they are human-specific and species
chauvanistic) means that philosophy and law cannot influence human
treatment of non-human domesticates. Clearly much, if not all, of the
unspeakable barbarism that prevails, for example, in factory farming
and experimental research, could be dealt with if we understood and
accepted the significance of such beings as members of the human so-
cial order. Brutality and cruelty, both physical and psychological, could
be treated as phenomena in their own right, without pedantic Cartesian
recourse to definitions of "objects". Brutality and cruelty within the
social order would be inherently wrong and thus punishable and pre-
ventable, regardless of the taxonomic or clinical classification and la-
belling of targets.
In addition, this argument can clearly be made on behalf of indi-
vidual non-domesticated species, held captive and occasionally tamed,
entirely within the human power structure, as are exotic pets, experi-
mental surrogates and the inhabitants of zoos, circuses, menageries and
so forth. In maintaining captive non-domesticates, there is no fostering
of social dependence. Indeed, since the animal is not "socialized", its
psychological suffering is probably much greater than that of the do-
mesticate. The same conclusions on rights would apply: if the animal is
contained in a power relationship - foreign to its psychology - it
deserves to have rights. It seems reasonable to expect that how those
rights would be exercised is a technical, not philosophic, challenge.
The custom which dictates that ethics and law cannot recognize
rights in sensate beings drawn into power relationships, is a manifesta-
tion of the a priori assumption that all non-human life is dedicated to
human service. The law cannot deal with this obstacle because it is
neither a moral nor a statutory issue. It is a cultural predisposition.,,
This prejudice is revealed in alleged humane legislation which turns on
the insertion of the word "unnecessary" before the word "suffering", in
attempts to deal with the physical and (rarely) psychological torment
inflicted upon both domesticated and non-domesticated animals used
for human service. One is never told what "necessary suffering" might
entail, merely that suffering on the part of non-human sensate beings is
at human discretion, for the furtherance of human enterprise, and sat-
isfaction of human desires. The assumption legitimating our discretion-
,o Routley and Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," in Mannison and
Routley, eds., Environmental Philosophy (1980) 96 on the chauvanism of our ethical systems.
" White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis (1968), 155 Science 1203. This early
statement of the Judeas-Christian roots of the "environmental crisis" has become a classic.
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ary power transcends all moral philosophy, all law. It is a given.
It is essential that it be understood that the human conquest of
nature and the planet, accomplished through sheer power, is translated
retroactively into the human right to dominate. No element of the envi-
ronmental discussion is as crucial; all flows from this radical source. I
have suggested that the modern scientific view, projected upon nature,
allows the inference of certain conclusions about the "survival of the
fittest" and other post-Darwinian rationalizations. On such reasonings,
people are the species who are the "fittest", having become dominant.
Ergo, human dominance is right, proper and natural. Ironically, far
from upsetting the human chauvinist applecart as he had originally
feared, Darwin legitimated the rationale for future generations.
Darwin's preference for progress, as manifested in the emergence
of new species, is of the greatest importance to Western thought: com-
petition produces the best of everything.
[M]ore recent forms must, on my theory, be higher than the more ancient; for
each new species is formed by having had some advantage in the struggle for life
over other and preceding forms . . . I do not doubt that this process of improve-
ment . . . has affected . . . the more recent and victorious forms of life, in com-
parison with the ancient and beaten forms. 12 [Emphasis added.]
Not long after Darwin wrote these words, the humanists were obliged
to accept human involvement in organic evolution. Eventually, pro-
gress, improvement and victory made the thought of such involvement
not merely tolerable, but positively attractive. To the victor go the
spoils, including rights over the vanquished.
Michael Peters points out that even if we are compelled to con-
sider human evolution as emerging from a struggle,
[I]nsofar as there are any values to be deduced from the science of biology, that
of fitness for survival puts all contemporary species on the same level. All species
which have managed to survive to the present day are biologically successful;
man is no more successful than any other.' 3
The humanist, however, must see humankind as more successful. Pe-
ters notes that the nineteenth century theory of evolution by natural
12 Darwin, On the Origin of Species (reprint ed., 1964) at 337. This is a facsimile of the first
(1859) edition with a valuable introduction by Ernst Mayr. Most available reprints are based on
the greatly modified sixth edition of 1872. The only other modern reprint of the first edition of
which I am aware, does not have the original pagination.
13 Peters, "Nature and Culture," in Godlovitch, Godlovitch and Harris, eds., Animals, Men
and Morals (1971) 213 at 226. The anthology in which it appears seems not to have received the
circulation and attention it richly merits; it contains some of the very best and most eloquent
arguments for animal welfare available. In One Cosmic Instant: A Natural History of Human
Arrogance (1973), 1 offered the metaphor of a "sphere" of life. All points on its surface are of
equal distance from its centre; all living species are of equal distance from their origin. Evolution
does not arrange species in a pyramid or a tree or a ladder.
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selection was in fact,
[A] remodelling of a much older idea of a hierarchy in nature. This time man
was placed at the apex instead of God, and the scale of gradation from the infer-
ior to the superior was conflated with the historical time-scale, so that in the
hierarchy of moral value the superior became synonomous with the most recent,
i.e. the most developed. This model was applied, and still applies, to the evalua-
tion of human societies as well as to animal species; it is the notorious concept of
inevitable progress. 4
It is interesting that there are different views on progress as ap-
plied to domesticated animals. There are those who see domesticates as
grotesque travesties of their wild antecedents.le On the other hand,
Darwin saw new breeds as improvements over "older and inferior
kinds."' 6 Surely, however, the qualitative assessment of animal breeds
and species cannot have logical relevance to their status as living sen-
sate participants in human society.
It can be said that the recognition of rights in domesticated and
captive animals would be an exercise in anthropomorphism. This would
be entirely acceptable, indeed necessary, for these purposes, on the
grounds that the physical and social environments in which they live
out their lives are in fact human environments. The animals - even
the captives - are expected to behave not in relation to other animals,
as they would in nature, but in relation to humans.17 Behaviour in rela-
tion to others is the most fundamental means of identifying one's social
"place". Their social place is in the human context, where prosthetic
rights prevail.
IV. PROSTHETIC RIGHTS FOR THE FREE?
Domesticated and captive animals are one thing, but wild nature is
another. There is at least one aspect of wild nature in which the con-
cept of prosthetic rights might apply. This is "sport" hunting, or recre-
', Peters, id.
" Shepard, in The Tender Carnivore and the Sacred Game (1973) at 15, argues that domes-
ticated animals are "well-padded drudges, insulated by blunted minds and coarsened bodies
against the uniformity of the barnyard . . . coming to terms with the grey world of captivity by
arriving at the lowest common denominator of survival." But, one might ask by what right did we
accomplish this?
16 Darwin, supra note 12, at 111.
27 Perhaps I may be forgiven for a personal note here. Many friends appear to be mildly
amused by the fact that I talk to my family dogs a great deal. The practical fact is that this is the
best way to "train" them - for them to learn the social ways of the household. More important,
however, the dogs are an integral part of the social organization of the household. The animals
belong, not in the proprietary sense, but in the sense of a social imperative. When I am teased for
behaving anthropomorphically, my rejoinder is that as a person that is the only way that I can
behave. Judging from their behaviour, I have little doubt that the dogs "canimorphize" humans.
Their behaviour is that of human-socialized dogs. There is no other way to behave.
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ational killing. Again, the human right of access for the most frivolous
of purposes is taken to be a given thing. It might be expected that the
law might eventually help to eradicate this practice if society were to
understand that recreational killing and wounding is inappropriate be-
haviour for moral animals.
This "sport" may be seen as a gratuitous intervention into nature
by the human power apparatus. The target animal is drawn into the
same relationship with the shooter as the lamb experiences with its
slaughterer. The argument that the wild quarry is "free", is spurious;
there is a relationship based on power. Killing - or sparing - is Cae-
sar's ultimate exercise of power over a lesser being. Surely no being of
whatever perceived rank has any obligation to enter, however briefly,
into such a relationship. The moment the target is within shooting
range, it should have the right to go its own way. The moral being
squinting along the gun-barrel has a moral decision to make, and the
ability to make it. As yet, because of the overwhelming species chau-
vinism of moral and legal authority, the shooter has no guidance. Para-
doxically, moral and legal authority would be exerted over a livestock
proprietor who began to shoot horses for recreation. Yet, qualitatively,
the relationship holds, and the situations are identical. As an illustra-
tion, a note should be made of the fenced-in shooting ranges in which
captive animals are offered as "sporting" targets. These three examples
are points on a continuum; the difference is in degree, not in kind.
Some advocates of "sport" killing defend it as a healthy competi-
tive pursuit: man against beast, one-on-one. Since only one participant
is aware of the contest, such a justification need not be considered on
either moral or logical grounds. Others rest their defence of recrea-
tional killing on ecologic, and thus technically proper, grounds. There
are often invocations of environmental management. If sufficient deer
are not killed in a given season, the ecological repercussions will be
severe: the deer will outgrow the carrying capacity of their environ-
ment. This, in turn, will have all sorts of dire ripple effects on vegeta-
tion, associated species, and eventually on the deer themselves - espe-
cially vis-A-vis next year's hunt. Hunting takes the place of natural
predation in the folkloric "balance of nature" because there are no nat-
ural predators left. And, of course, sport killing is cleaner, more effi-
cient and more merciful than natural predation. What is steadfastly
ignored is that predation naturally has little or not effect on prey popu-
lations. Rather, predator numbers fluctuate as the result of naturally
changing numbers of their prey. The sporting community does not like
natural ebbs and flows; it likes guaranteed "harvests". It is for this
reason there is wildlife management, which so often involves predator
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Barry Holstun Lopez argues that the natural act of predation in-
cludes a "conversation of death."' 8 At the critical encounter, predator
and prey may stare fixedly at each other. During this moment, a deci-
sion seems to be made as to whether the predator will or will not at-
tack. Lopez maintains that what appears to be happening is "an ex-
change of information between predator and prey that either triggers a
chase or defuses the hunt right there."'19 Many observers, including my-
self, have seen predators stop, look and turn away from an apparent
"sure thing." In addition, a prey animal has been seen to "identify"
itself as the one to be selected from the herd. It is as though the act of
natural predation were mutually agreed upon. The same cannot be said
of sport killing, in spite of its often ritualized trappings. There is only
one participant aware of the ritual; the conversation is one-sided.
However, on Lopez's view, the apparent communication between
predator and prey is a "ceremonial exchange": "In this way both ani-
mals, not the predator alone, choose for the encounter to end in death.
There is, at least, a sacred order in this. There is nobility. ' 20 The phe-
nomenon he describes would appear to be some ancient interspecies
pact, arrived at over thousands of years of joint evolution, not an ar-
rangement of rights and obligations. The pact is clearly not a power
relationship, and since predator and prey are of two unrelated species,
neither the domesticator of the other, it is clearly not a social relation-
ship. In this relationship, the concept of rights has no meaning.
Some observers would, however, be able to perceive intraspecies
rights, or at least, intragroup rights, especially in those species that are
highly social. It is tempting to see each individual member of a well-
functioning group as not only having a social place in relation to others,
but also as having a right to that place against all others. This is an
unnecessary anthropomorphism, projected upon the social group. It oc-
curs because we are taught to expect strife and competition as the
norm, and would like to see this counterbalanced by the right of the
individual to a place in the "pecking-order." But, if the concept of
dominance competition is removed,2' the necessity for a competitive
18 Lopez, Of Wolves and Men (1978) at 62.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 94.
21 For works that also argue for the removal of the dominance-competition concept from our
society, see Haraway, Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic (1978), 4
Signs: J. Women in Culture & Soc'y (n.p.); Brownlee, Bioligical Complementariness (1981); Liv-
ingston, The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation (1981); Fedigan, Primate Paradigms: Sex Roles
and Social Bonds (1982). There are also many other recent speculations, some as yet unpublished.
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place, and thus the necessity for the right to that place, is also re-
moved. As non-human social behaviour is beginning to be understood,
every individual has a place by simple virtue of presence. This does not
need to be seen as a claim.
There are, of course, exceptions; all is not unbroken tranquility.
Everyone has seen occasional incidents of aggressiveness and fighting in
non-human social groups. I would venture to say that all such excep-
tions are stress-induced, arising from difficulties involving food, popula-
tion, illness, disturbance, habitat disruption, social disruption and a va-
riety of other factors. They very often manifest themselves as
communication problems. Physical or psychological stress seems almost
always to be at the root of aggressive-competitive behaviour in social
species. The only normal competetive activity is probably play.
V. THE ULTIMATE EXTENSION
On the assumption that the existence of rights, whether inter or
intraspecies, cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated in non-human na-
ture, we are left with its palpable necessity in the human relationship
with domesticated and captive animals, and with the targets of recrea-
tional killing. What must be done about those aspects of nature - non-
game species and wild nature - which are of the most pressing con-
cern to conservation, preservation and environmental groups?
A starting point is the status of national parks. As in so much of
the reflection on environmental rights, there is a move into the
neighbourhood of the reductio. Some of the smaller national parks of
the world are little more than extended menageries. Most of the ani-
mals inhabiting them are not under our direct control as individuals,
but they are certainly under our control as local populations of their
species. Breeding stock is often introduced to improve the genetic
"mix". Wildlife management in the national parks and game reserves
is a growth industry. More and more, populations of large species, at
least, are manipulated in the long-term interest not only of the biologi-
cal community but also of the tourist trade and international balances
of payments. Indeed, many of the ungulate species are under more in-
tensive management in other areas, leading toward domestication, or
are made available for shooting on game "ranches". All of these, even
those moving freely within the fenced parks, are directly under our dis-
cretionary control. They have been subsumed into our organization. As
members of the technostructure, or the managed community, they
should have rights equivalent to those of any other members of that
(prosthetic) community.
The reductio is closer, camouflaged by questions of degree. What
1984]
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will be done about the really large national and wilderness parks, or
wild places in general, not yet cordoned off? My argument would seem
to require that such places and their non-human inhabitants would not
have rights against us, because they have no power relationship with
us. But such places are often the last refuge of endangered, threatened,
rare or vulnerable species, on whose behalf constant vigilance is main-
tained. The occasional result is to bring captive specimens to world-
class zoos for controlled breeding toward eventual restoration to the
wild, or, salvation in captivity. Certainly, those individual captives have
moved into the realm of human control, and thus, of rights. But, has
the species? Or, has its unique habitat also gained a status deserving of
rights, when the animal is officially listed as endangered?
On this analysis, the ultimate question for the environmentalists et
al. is whether all of non-human nature ought to move into the control
of the human relationship. Presumably, the goal is to prevent such a
relationship from developing. But, if it is prevented, then the goal of
environmental rights must be relinquished. Taken to its extreme, the
result of the extension of rights would be to "humanize", or domesti-
cate the entire planet. All life would be a human farm. All would have
decent treatment. All would live happily ever after. It must be re-
membered, however, that the administrator of the extended enterprise
would receive proportionately extended obligations and responsibilities.
Is anyone willing to accept them?
If the domestication of the planet is thought desirable, the price of
total conquest would be to confer rights on all species conquered, usa-
ble against everyone. But past evidence of the human conquest of na-
ture displays massive extinctions, widespread suffering and disfigure-
ment. Accordingly, either total domestication could not take place
because each new expansionist move would create a new array of rights
to stall it, or rights would have to be subtracted for a majority and
selectively retained for a few. That would not amount to moral or ethi-
cal behaviour toward those under our total control as part of the plane-
tary estate. The argument leads to chasms of absurdity.
As a "nature preservationist," I take no satisfaction from the ap-
parent absurdity of environmental rights. The exercise does, however,
have residual merit, if only for having shown that environmental
despoilation, degradation and the barbarous interspecies behaviour of
humankind may have no remedies within the Western cultural tradi-
tion. These problems cannot be resolved by the familiar disciplinary
tools. Tortured logic and absurd conclusions are inevitable so long as
we persist in huddling within conventional legal and moral ground
rules. The need is not to invest endless time, energy and creativity in
[VOL. 22, No. 2
Rightness or Rights
futile attempts to rationalize rights for non-humans within the existing
belief structure, but rather to systematically address, with every intel-
lectual tool at our disposal, the pathological species-chauvinist belief
structure itself. The humanist tradition dictates that people have abso-
lute rights against all things non-human, and that the human interest is
the court of last resort.
Some philosophers and legal scholars have already recognized the
merits and demands of this challenge. Those who have accepted the
challenge have found disciplinary precedent scarce. This is understand-
able. The present relationships with other species, so far as rights and
obligations are concerned, are logical outcomes of a unidimensional and
egocentric vision of the world. To extend concepts of rights into nature
- Caesar's ultimate exercise of power - would be to export and legit-
imate a pathological obsession with hierarchical relationships. As such,
the choice is clear: either we must acknowledge the intrinsic "right-
ness" of non-human existences and sensibilities and express that ac-
knowledgement in human behaviour, backed by law, or, complete the
"humanization" of the planet by making all living things unwitting
participants in a prosthetic moral hierarchy.
1984]

